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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
CHANGING CONCEPTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PATTERN
IN THE UNITED STATES--1865 TO 1917
By
PAUL DOLAN*
Many students of American government consider the period between the
dose of the War Between the States and the presidency of Woodrow Wilson
to be one of utmost significance to the constitutional development of the nation.
The changes effected in legal thinking during this span of time were not only
numerous but profound, so profound in fact that the very nature of the gov-
ernment appears to have been altered by them.
To enumerate these changes would be impossible in the brief space allotted
this paper. To meet the dewands of brevity and yet to show something of the
significance of these changes to constitutional development requires that we
examine at least the concepts respecting (1) the theory of the state, (2) the
nature of law, and (3) the use of the Constitution as a tool in executing the
political will of the society which was formed during the latter part of the last
century.
In discussing the changes occurring in the theory of the state, it is im-
portant to remember that between the adoption of the Constitution and the
War Between the States there was persistent and erudite argument respecting
the assumptions underlying the American state system. Although a nation had
formed with the acquisition of the territory between the Appalachians and the
Pacific, there was no general agreement among the people who made up that
nation respecting the form of their political society. Some able men referred
to the government as a perpetual union of sovereign states. Others called
it a federal republic without succinctly defining the term. Some thought of it
as a group of sovereign states, each of which, acting in a sui juris capacity, had
consented, with the right to withdraw that consent, to a federal compact. Over the
issue of slavery these disparate theories clashed. Accommodation, tenuous at best
in the three decades preceding 1860, became impossible, and men went to war.
As the batteries on the shores of Charleston harbor reduced the defenses
of Sumter, the uneasy compromises which had been effected between the south-
ern states and the federal authority disappeared. After the arbitrament of arms,
there emerged a new concept of the American state system. No longer would it
be probable that a state or group of states could declare in all seriousness that
it or they might legally withdraw from the federal compact. T1he Supreme Court
had touched the note of this future theme of government when it had declared
*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Delaware, Newark, Dela.
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this nation to be indestructible. With the success of the northern arms it was
to be a nation that would endure.' No longer was there to be legal justification
for the "jealous particularism that .. .had obstructed .. .coalescing national
unity."
Concomitant with the theory that henceforth the United States was an
indestructible union came the idea of national citizenship. The abolition of slavery
under the 13th Amendment freed a vast mass of persons whose servile status
had been declared by the highest authority.2 Under a new amendment to the
Constitution these persons were to be made citizens not only of the states in
which they resided but of the general government. National citizenship was at
last formally decreed and defined.8
Under the theory of the state that the entire people of the United States
was sovereign and supreme in its power to make law through legally constituted
means, there was introduced into the constitutional thinking of the day the idea
that the rights of the pople were to be guaranteed by the national government.
No longer were citizens of the United States to suffer denial of their unalienable
rights which had been vouchsafed them under a theory of natural law. No longer
could a person living in the United States be subjected to assaults upon his
individual dignity by the government of a state without due process of law.
"The inborn rights of every person within the jurisdiction of the nation" were
not to be abridged "by the unconstitutional acts of any state." 4 No state was to
deny any person life, liberty, or property without due process, and the federal
government was bound to guarantee this provision. Thus a lever was given the
national authority for making states respect both the concept of fair procedure
in applying their laws against persons and the theory that substantive rights of
life, liberty and property were ordained by a law superior to the power of
a state legislature. This change in the source of competence with respect to
the protection and guarantee of human rights bulked large in the course which
constitutional development was to follow in the next century of American life.
The period between the Civil War and the First World War is not marked
by as many learned discourses on political theory as is the ante-bellum period.
Many of those students of American jurisprudence who attempted to develop
a theory of American government during the latter half of the 19th century were
infected with the organistic ideas of German political thought. Although several
men in high positions of state and in places of learning throughout the country
pondered the abstract principles of government, the run of the American
people were too busy with the material aspects of their culture to bother with
I Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (1869).
2 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard 393 (1857).
8 U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
4 Speech of Sen. Bingham before Congress on report of the joint committee on Reconstruction,
cited in C. B. Swisher, AMmulc:AN CONSTnUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Boston, 1943) p. 332.
5 F. G. Wilson, The Repival of Organic Theory in 36 A.P.S.R. 454 (1942).
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mental meanderings into the realm of political assumptions. They saw the
farms grow, the railroads span the continent; they smelled the smoke of the
factories, and watched the cities spread. They believed they were fairly well
off, and that they lived in a chosen land. They abhorred the attack by imported
and home-grown radicals against the American system. They wanted no truck
with radicalism. McKinley's death at the hands of an anarchist made the people
fearful of everything foreign. Those who opposed the American way of life
or questioned the institutions of the country were felt to be bent upon destroying
the nation. If there was any articulate concept among the citizenry in late 19th
century America respecting the state, it was that we were a nation with a
glorious destiny. The chief obstacle in the path of American progress would
be governmental action aimed at curtailing the free play of American initiative.
It was the duty of those in authority to see that the path was kept dear. When-
ever the political branches of the government failed to meet this injunction,
the judicial authority was called upon. In observing how the Court went about its
task of maintaining this basic idea of government, we must turn to the con-
cepts held by the majority of the justices respecting the nature of law. It was
from the theory of law held by the Court that the rationalization came which
opposed the appeal made by many political reformers at the turn of the century
for greater governmental control of the national economy.
With the end of the Civil War the nation began a process of industralization
the like of which the world had never seen. Factories, which had mushroomed to
meet the needs of war, cast their shadows over budding metropolises. America
became a mass of steel and stone in which a growing horde of humanity toiled
and struggled and hoped.
Over this complex industrial civilization reigned a group of entrepreneurs,
whose activities were rationalized under the doctrine of laissez faire. Although
these captains of industry were often too busy to worry about such things as legal
concepts, their lawyers realized that their actions would sooner or later have
to be justified under a theory of law if they were to continue. The accuracy
of this observation soon became apparent. The state legislature of Illinois, as
early as the 1870's enraged at an attempt at monopoly in the storage of grain,
had brought such action within the realm of the public interest and had declared
such monopolies capable of regulation. To the Supreme Court of the United
States went the legal retainers of the entrepreneurs.
Previously, a case had been decided in the Supreme Court upholding the
creation of a monopoly by a state legislature.6 At that time the Court had split
five to four on the issue of whether the state's action interfered with the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States. The majority had
6 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873),
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found it had not. Of greater interest to constitutional thinking, however, was
the dissent of two justices, who referred to the newly ratified 14th Amend-
ment's due process clause. That dissent introduced the concept of substantive due
process to the American constitutional pattern. The right of property, held by
Locke to be a sacred adjunct of man, was expanded to meet the demands of the
rising corporations and the entrepreneur class for protection against legislative
action on the part of state governments.
When the Illinois statute restricting the grain elevator operator in the
manipulation of his property came before the Supreme Court, the justices again
divid'ed.7 The majority still conceived of due process as procedural, and held
the regulation of elevator rates justified under the doctrine of public interest.
Justice Field looked with alarm upon such regulation. He had by now grasped
the full significance of the dissent in the Slaughterhouse decision. He joined the
concept of vested rights with that of substantive due process and used the mixture
to protect the use of private property against political action. He declared the
kind of regulation suggested by the Illinois legislature anathema to the concept
of liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. Such an invasion of private
rights placed all property at the mercy of a majority of the legislature. This
was tyranny.$
Though as yet a dissent, the doctrine of substantive due process was now
sufficiently stated for it to become the beacon on the legal path which the
corporation lawyers were to cut as America became an industrial colossus. The
dissent in Munn v. Illinois marked the beginning of a long period of legal
thinking in which state legislation affecting private property was subjected to
the test of whether or not it met the personal concepts of rightness tucked in the
recesses of the justices' minds. Commerce and industry in a big America were
not to be placed at the mercy of the popular will, which might be opposed to
"progress." America could progress only if "the skill, the business sense, and good
fortune" of its industrial leaders were given free rein. Was this not the way
of nature which had been fashioned by God and witnessed by a national prosperity
whose bounds were unlimited? To interfere with business and the exercise of
private property was to stem the hand of nature. Such action would be sure to
bring chaos and utter destruction to a nation foolish enough to attempt it.
Threaded throughout this religio-economic thinking was the idea. of national
supremacy. The right of a state legislature to foul the lines of national progress
was inconceivable.
During the 1870's and 1880's state after state attempted to regulate railroads
in their jurisdictions. Regulation of rail rates was interference with private
property. This kind of legislation furnished the target against which the arrow
' Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 92 (1877).
8 See Field's dissent in C. B. & Q, R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 96, (1877).
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of substantive due process was directed by the Court. By 1890, the Court had
begun the piecemeal destruction of state legislative attempts to fix the charges
made by railroads. These statutes deprived the roads of their "right to a judicial
investigation by due process of law," and were ipso facto unreasonable. Reason-
ableness of a statute was to be determined by a judicial survey. No longer was
a legislature to be the judge of what was reasonable at law; the Court had
preempted that role for itself.
Rate regulation was basically economic. The, human element, though hidden
deep within it, did not show on the surface. As the century made its turn, how-
ever, the state legislatures attempted the prevention of bad working conditions,
long hours, and poor health among the workers. Abetted by the rising interest
in sociology, psychology, and the statistical approach to these studies, the popular
assemblies sought to ameliorate the conditions of industrial employment. Regula-
tion of mines, bakeries and sweat shops was enacted. The Supreme Court, steeped
in the philosophy of Field and his colleagues, looked with suspicion upon this new
use of the state police power. In some cases the Court did not destroy the legisla-
tive effort;9 in others it spoke against the statutes. Somewhere within the rea-
soning of the Court was the idea that some kind of regulation was needed. How
far that regulation would or should go became a fundamental problem for the
justices. Most of them were fearful that regulation would get out of hand and
reduce the use of property to the point where private initiative would be stifled
and American ingenuity would vanish. The majority of the justices firmly
believed in the theory of laissez faire, but like a bit of yeast in a batch of dough
the leaven of economic reform was beginning to work. Laissez faire was beset by
a rival-the duty of the state to provide the means by which a decent standard
of living could be obtained by a majority of the people. The gage of this battle
was seen in the dissent in the baker's case.10 Holmes' opinion marked the
beginning of a new approach to the meaning of the Constitution. It was no
longer to mean the embodiment of a "particular economic theory." Rather
it was to be considered a modus operandi for the regulation of societal living
"for people of fundamentally differing views"; it was not to serve as a strait-jacket
confining a dynamic people within the clasp of the mort main of an outworn era.
By 1917 this use of the Constitution had challenged the concept of the sanctity
of private property." It was not a full-out assault, however, and the phalanx
of conservatism remained intact.
While state regulation of economic activities languished under the severe
gaze of a conservative majority on the Court, the federal Congress, reflecting
the pressure of a more articulate electorate and the changes taking place in the
9 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
10 Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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control of political power, increased its regulation of the social and economic
activities of the citizen. With the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act and
the attempt at control of monopolies in commerce, the federal government began
the steady movement toward the establishment of far-flung economic controls,
which have marked the activity of the federal authority during the past fifty
years. These efforts met at first with serious challenge when the Court decreed
that business of a manufacturing nature could not possibly be controlled by
the federal government.12 The rising tide of popular participation in the political
arena, however, swept in upon the conservative philosophy. The Court, in decree-
ing the federal income tax unconstitutional, had unleashed a veritable fury
in the opposition to the concept that the federal taxing power was strictly
limited. Bryan charged the Court with reactionary leanings. Though defeated
at the polls, his supporters underwent a change in party label and emerged as
part of the Progressive and New Freedom movements. The force of their de-
mands, coupled with the growing feeling among large segments of the citizenry
that some reforms were needed, resulted in the enactment of the 16th and 17th
Amendments. Incomes were now to be taxed and senators to be elected by popular
vote. In the meantime the Court, sensing the ground swell, bent a bit and
gave approval to more effective enforcement of the Sherman anti-trust statute
and the railroad regulatory acts. In addition to these economic controls, the
Congress set about to clean up the morals of the people. Lotteries were pro-
hibited, traffic in loose women enjoined, and adulterated food condemned. The
Court gave its approbation. Although it was as yet impossible to eliminate child
labor because of its close connection, in the opinion of the Court, with the
sacred right of property, economic and social reform was underway. The Con-
stitution was fast becoming a tool in the fashioning of the political will into
law.
Between 1865 and 1917 at least three major changes took place in con-
stitutional thinking in the United States. Fundamental was the change in the
attitude toward the federal compact. Instead of a group of states, tenuously
banded together under a theory containing incompatible elements of state
sovereignty and federal supremacy, there was developed the idea of a nation of
the American people. Along with this concept went the fact of national citizen-
ship for all those born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Con-
comitant with the establishment of civil rights under the general government
the theory of substantive due process and the doctrine of judicial review as-
sumed greater proportions in determining the course of public policy. Popular
assemblies were not to be entrusted with the protection of the sacred precincts
of private property. Only the Court, guided by the dictates of reason extracted
12 U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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from the "brooding omnipresence" of the natural law, was fit to determine
the limits of the constitutional injunctions concerning due process. The ability
of the people to govern themselves through the medium of their chosen repre-
sentatives apparently was challenged, although few judges would have admitted
they had placed themselves in the position of the legislature.
Within recent years, the Court has shifted its rule respecting the sanctity of
property, but the reincarnation of the concept of natural law, in the guise of
substantive due process, has aided the justices in fashioning a formula for the
protection of civil liberties against the action of a state authority. The 14th
Amendment's due process clause is the weapon with which the Court has repelled
local assaults upon personal freedom.
Turning to the commerce and taxing powers of the general government
the Court has permitted the Congress to employ these powers as means for
the regulation of social and economic activities which were considered detri-
mental to the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people of the
United States. Though no blanket police power, as used by the states, has ever
adhered to the federal government-and logically cannot under a theory of
enumerated powers-the concept that Congress could use its commerce and
taxing powers in a sumptuary manner bedded itself in the American con-
stitutional pattern. With the development of an industrial economy the Court
recognized the need for some controls over the use of property in order to pro-
mote the welfare of the greater number of citizens. It was this change of at-
titude which helped prepare the way for the evolvement of a jurisprudence of
the welfare state. As the nation rolled into high gear industrially there was a de-
cided need for a re-thinking of the place of the law in an industrialized society.
The beginnings of that re-thinking are manifest in the decisions of the Court in
recognizing the need for the Congress to adjust the operation of the industrial
machinery, and by so doing keep it from jamming the complex mechanism of
democratic government.
The period between the wars is of great significance to a knowledge of the
American constitutional system. It points dramatically to the effect which popular
attitude can have upon such basic matters as the theory of the state. It shows
the influence capable of being wielded by the Supreme Court in the determina-
tion of the type of national economy. It is in this period that one can see the
tremendous flexibility of the Constitution, which makes it capable of adjustment
to a rapidly changing social and economic environment. Perhaps there has been
no other time when the American constitutional system was more seriously
questioned than it was during the years between Lincoln and Wilson. The
Constitution was shaken to its bed-rock by the catastrophe of civil strife; it
was strained by the pressure of economic expansion; it was tested severely by
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the presence of a sizable alien population concentrated in the political volcanoes
of th eastern seaboard cities. Yet it survived. The fact that it did is mute testi-
mony to the ingenuity of its farmers, the wisdom of its developers, and the
ability of the American people to live under a system of law which permits
politicial compromise and adjustment to the realities of social existence.
